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Special Issue:
Affirmative Action in the 2 1 st Century:
Reflections on Grutter v. Bollinger
and Gratz v. Bollinger
The Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly is pleased to present
the first of two issues devoted to a most challenging issue: affirmative
action. These companion issues, Volume 30, number four, and
Volume 31, number one, attempt to reflect the breadth of opinions,
implications, and consequences arising from the Supreme Court's
recent pronouncements on affirmative action in higher education -
Grutter v. Bollinger' and Gratz v. Bollinger.
This is not the first time the Quarterly has touched upon
affirmative action. In 1978, the Supreme Court decided Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,3 a case that framed the next two and
a half decades of social, legal, and political debates over the place of
affirmative action in American society. The Quarterly was there
twenty-five years ago to capture the variety of legal opinions
concerning affirmative action in higher education. In 1976, Larry M.
Lavinksy, then Chairman of the National Civil Rights Committee of
the Anti-Defamation League of the B'Nai B'rith, bemoaned "special
admissions programs like those involved in Bakke [because] they
utilize racial quotas and preference, the traditional engines of
discrimination, as the vehicle for social progress., 4 In 1978, Professor
Bernard Schwartz noted that in Bakke, the Court "gained for the
country and its Constitution a significant breathing space, in which
political institutions and public opinion can try further to cope with
1. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
2. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
3. 438 U.S. 265 (1968).
4. Larry M. Lavinsky, A Moment of Truth on Racially Based Admissions, 3 HAST.
CONST. L.Q. 879, 889 (1976).
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the problem" of race-based admissions programs In 1979, Professor
Julius Stone predicted that the risks of a multi-factorial admission
approach, Justice Powell's now-famous "race as a plus factor"
approach, would have "the redeeming virtues of inviting or even
demanding a period of enlightened and imaginative experimentation"
in race-conscious admission policies.
6
Given the Quarterly's past involvement in the legal discourse on
affirmative action, the Editors decided to continue to capture the
various cascades, rivers, tributaries, and streams of legal opinion and
predictions flowing from the Court's first pronouncement on
affirmative action in the twenty-five years since Bakke. These two
companion issues feature comments and articles from some of the
most noted constitutional scholars of our time.
In this first issue, Sarah Zearfoss, Assistant Dean and Director of
Admissions at the University of Michigan Law School, provides a
unique firsthand account of the Law School's admissions decisions.
Professor Ronald Turner of the University of Houston Law Center
explores the arguments against affirmative action in the social and
legal landscape. David Levine, Professor of Law at The University of
California Hastings College of the Law, reflects on the lessons the
San Francisco public school's attempts to use race-neutral assignment
plans in its schools may teach other school districts in the wake of
Grutter and Gratz. Finally, Vikram David Amar, Professor of Law at
The University of California Hastings College of the Law, and Evan
Caminker, Professor of Law and Dean of the University of Michigan
Law School, comment on the meaning and jurisprudential
implications of Justice O'Connor's "sunset provision" in Grutter.
As law students ourselves, the debate over affirmative action has
figured prominently in our experiences in college and graduate
school. We can take to heart Justice O'Connor's observation that,
"given the important purpose of public education and the expansive
freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university
environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional
tradition."7 It is our hope to capitalize on our position as students by
collecting these comments in order to continue the Quarterly's
tradition of producing an innovative and scholarly review of current
5. Bernard Schwartz, Foreward - The Supreme Court, October 1977 Term, 6 HAST.
CONST. L.Q. 1, 6 (1978).
6. Julius Stone, Equal Protection in Special Admissions Programs: Forward from
Bakke, 6 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 719, 750 (1979).
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